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ABSTRACT: This project examines Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code and 
agriculture land exchanges. Stakeholders in rural communities and agriculture are 
particularly interested in Section 1031 because the recent growth in transaction values of 
farmland may have, in part, been stimulated by Section 1031 land exchanges. Further, 
although many have speculated that such exchanges are widely used, little empirical 
research exists about the provision. We examine the theory of exchanges and develop a 
theoretical premium value for exchanges. We also present the first evidence of like-kind 
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INTRODUCTION 
  The potential impact of fluctuations in the value of real estate, or real property, on 
the overall economy became painfully apparent in the U.S. and many other parts of the 
world in 2008.  While most of the attention has been focused on the bubble in housing 
there was an equivalently dramatic rise in the value of farmland transactions. While there 
were many common and uncommon factors that led to the rise in residential and 
agricultural land transaction values, a piece of the Federal tax code (Section 1031) related 
to the treatment of capital gains could have provided a pathway for the housing bubble to 
significantly affect farmland transaction prices. While there is widespread belief that the 
rapid increase in the use of 1031 exchanges in recent years may have contributed to the 
increase in the transaction prices of farmland
1, this is the first empirical examination of 
this question at the national level.  
Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code permits taxpayers to defer the 
recognition of gains or losses for tax purposes from the disposition of property if the 
taxpayer engages in a ‘like kind’ exchange. The use of like-kind exchanges in all types of 
real estate increased significantly starting in the late 1990’s. Recent research has shown 
that 1031 buyers pay more for property and take on more risk than other buyers in the 
commercial real estate sector (Ling and Petrova, 2008).   
There are a few important characteristics of the policy and the market for 
farmland that could have allowed like-kind exchanges to have a significant effect on farm 
land values. 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper, when we use the term “value of farmland” or “land value” we are referring to the 
transaction value, not the “productive value” of the land, which is a term associated with the value of the 
agricultural output of the land.   2 
1)  Section 1031 requires that a replacement property is identified within 
45 days of the sale of the previous property and that the exchange is 
completed within 180 days.   
2)  An equivalent value of real property must be exchanged to completely 
defer capital gains tax on the sale of the relinquished property.  
3)  The housing boom stimulated the sale of farmland for residential and 
commercial development where this farmland was sold at a much 
higher price than an equivalent parcel of farmland without development 
pressure. 
4)  A relatively small amount of farmland is available for purchase in any 
given year.   
A typical transaction might involve the sale of a parcel of farmland to a developer 
at a higher price than what equivalent land that would be expected to remain in 
agriculture would be sold for. The seller then has a limited time frame to identify and 
purchase another piece of real estate of equivalent value to defer paying capital gains tax.  
This could require purchasing a much larger amount of land than was sold if the seller 
prefers to purchase farmland that will remain in agriculture.  Given that a relatively small 
amount of farmland is available for purchase at any given point in time there is 
significant pressure to buy what is available causing upward price pressure on farmland, 
which is exacerbated if the seller prefers to buy land in a particular area. As a result, the 
sale of a relatively small amount of farmland to a developer for a comparatively high 
price could potentially result in a significant increase in the sale price of farmland as 
those seeking to meet the 1031 exchange requirements compete with other buyers.     3 
While many parties have speculated about the extent and degree to which real 
farm property was being disposed of through like-kind exchanges and its effect on farm 
land values, there has been limited research on the topic. Concerns were raised in a 2006 
article in the Farm Journal about Section 1031 “shaking up” rural America by creating a 
competition between young farmers and urban landlords (Bernick 2006). The article 
suggests that younger farmers wishing to acquire farmland are often outbid by investors 
with “1031 money”, who are in some cases older farmers who own large, valuable tracts 
and wish to avoid paying capital gains taxes and preserve their investment in the land 
through an exchange until they can pass the land to heirs. Despite these claims, little is 
known about the true volume of such exchanges. 
In this article we address some of these concerns to the extent the data allow us. 
We present the first national analysis of tax data for like-kind exchanges deferring capital 
gains under Section 1031. Using data from the IRS’s Sales of Capital Assets Panel Study, 
we examine like-kind exchanges and total farm land sales for the years from 1999 to 
2005. We present a time-series of exchange volume as well as data on the characteristics 
of the exchange including the value of assets involved and the value of gains deferred. 
Further, because of the detail of the tax data, we are able to examine the extent to which 
famers are participating in Section 1031 like-kind exchanges. Together, these data 
provide insight into the relative importance of such exchanges.  
 
BACKGROUND 
Section 1031 of the IRS Code
2 allows for the nonrecognition of gain or loss from 
exchanges solely in kind. The Code holds that property must be productive or investment 
                                                 
2 As amended through December 31, 2008.   4 
property, such as real estate, and exchanged for a property that is of like kind, and meets 
other requirements, such as timeliness of identification.  In practice this means that an 
owner of real estate, working with an exchange intermediary who temporarily holds the 
titles involved in the exchange, may sell it and buy another piece of real estate that is of 
like kind and defer capital gains taxes, assuming there was a gain. As an example, an 
owner of a shopping center may sell the shopping center and buy agricultural land under 
Section 1031. 
Tax-deferred exchanges have been around in one form or another for quite a 
while. The Revenue Act of 1921 established a provision that allowed for a tax-deferred 
exchange of assets that loosely resembled the Section 1031 of the Code as it stands today. 
Subsequently, revisions were made, and in 1979, in the case of Starker v. United States, 
clarification was given on the mechanics of a nonsimultaneous exchange and a ruling 
established the meaning of term “like-kind”. 
Recently, important actions by the IRS have helped to clarify how 1031 
exchanges may be conducted, what types of ownership would be considered permissible, 
and how a request for a ruling from the Service should be structured. The practical effect 
for taxpayers of these actions was to reduce uncertainty about the exchange, therefore 
increasing the likelihood of successfully deferring capital gains.
3 
Like-kind exchanges have received limited attention in the literature, probably 
because of the uncertainty created by the code prior to the aforementioned IRS revenue 
procedures. The first research on the issue we have identified comes from Cowell and 
Dehring (2001). In their article, they develop a model of “tax-free” exchange for 
farmland under a simultaneous exchange scenario. They simplify the exchange case 
                                                 
3 See Revenue Procedures 2000-37 and 2002-22.   5 
between a farmer and a developer by only considering the net cash from a transaction. By 
doing this, they express the sale versus exchange decision as a function of price and acre 
ratios. Considering a case of a farmer owning undeveloped land that a developer wishes 
to develop, a developer can purchase land outright from the farmer or can purchase other 
land and offer it to the farmer in an exchange. The essence of their argument is that the 
farmer has an incentive to exchange with developers based on the potential value of the 
capital gains deferral, and developers will agree to an exchange if they can offer a 
replacement property of less value than what they would have to pay to buy the 
undeveloped property. 
Other Section 1031 research focuses on commercial real estate. In 2002, Holmes 
and Slade examined the impact of tax-deferred exchanges in the commercial real estate 
market of Phoenix, Arizona. They argue that the restrictions, particularly those 
concerning asset identification and disposal, imposed by the Section constrain exchangers 
and create price premiums. Owners of capital assets who choose to exchange a piece of 
property, in this case real property, face several complicating issues. In order to meet IRS 
requirements for a Section 1031 exchange, owners must adhere to time constraints for 
identifying replacement property and disposing of the relinquished property. Compliance 
risk may force the taxpayer exchanging the assets to pay a premium on the price. In 
addition, the taxpayer will incur transaction costs associated with the exchange, which 
may be higher that the costs associated with a taxable sale. Holmes and Slade use detailed 
market data from the CoStar Group to examine the effect the Section 1031 has on price 
differentials in the apartment market. Using the hedonic analysis, they show that the 
“price pressure hypothesis” is responsible for increasing the price of the replacement   6 
property in a statistically significant way, though the price of the relinquished property is 
not affected.  
Recently, Ling and Petrova (2008) study the effect of tax-deferred exchanges on 
transaction prices in multiple commercial real estate markets, focusing on the theoretical 
reservation price and observed market price. They first present a numerical tax-deferral 
valuation model to calculate the value of a capital gain tax deferral. In essence, the model 
compares the net present value (NPV) of a sale-purchase to the NPV of an exchange. The 
NPVs depend on many factors, including transaction costs, sales price of the disposed 
asset, acquisition price of the replacement asset, allowable depreciation, and holding 
periods for assets. The estimated magnitude of the tax deferral benefits increase with the 
length of holding of a relinquished property—a function of the accumulated gain. The 
value of tax-deferral is also positively related to the proposed length of the holding period 
of the replacement property because the tax benefit is felt immediately, and the benefit 
increases with the value of the capital gain tax. On the other hand, higher exchange costs 
reduce the tax-deferral benefit. Their numerical analysis based on the theory of such an 
exchange suggests a 5-10% price effect due to the tax-deferral. 
  To empirically estimate the value of capital gain of tax deferral, Ling and Petrova 
use a hedonic framework. They estimate the price of a property as a function of the 
characteristics of the property plus the impact the tax-deferred exchange has on price vis-
à-vis the relative bargaining positions of the sellers and buyers. 
  Ling and Petrova use three proxies to measure the impact of bargaining, each a 
binary variable for 1) the sale of property used by the buyer to complete a 1031 
exchange, 2) the sale of property being used to replace a property (or begin the   7 
transaction), and 3) the sale of a property that is being used by the buyer and seller to 
complete a transaction and begin a transaction, respectively. Results show that taxpayers 
pay a price premium to acquire replacement property. In terms of economic significance, 
the results from the empirical study suggest buyers are paying a price premium of 5-35% 
to purchase replacement property, depending on the local market—a figure far higher in 
many cases than their theoretical model predicts. 
 
MODEL 
  To consider whether the potential to defer taxes on capital gains from the sale of 
real property could affect the sale price of a parcel of farmland, we modify the model put 
forth by Ling and Petrova. We also evaluate the expression in order to examine the 
comparative statics and make predictions about how the value of the exchange varies 
with policy changes. While IRC section 1031 applies to the sale of any investment real 
property limiting this analysis to farmland simplifies analysis because it minimizes the 
importance of capital depreciation that is much more relevant when buildings rather than 
land constitute a majority of the property value. According to the Code, land cannot 
depreciate, and buildings constitute a small portion of the total value of most farmland 
sales. Therefore, we eliminate the consideration of depreciation. To compare apples to 
apples it is assumed that the original property is of the same value for the exchange and 
sale. 
To estimate the potential effect of exchanges on land values we consider the 
scenario where a hypothetical landowner acquires a property in period t-m that is 
relinquished in period t, at which point a second property is acquired that is then sold in   8 
period t+n. A sale–purchase approach is one option where the first property is sold and 
tax is paid on the increased value of the land over the holding period, and then a second 
property is acquired that is the value of what remains after taxes and other costs are paid 
after the sale.  Alternatively, the owner can perform an exchange and defer paying capital 
gains tax in period t. Assuming no additional financing is available, this allows them to 
acquire a more valuable property than was possible when using a sale–purchase.  
Although, when the second property is sold capital gains are based on the original basis, 
or the value of the first property in period t-m. To recap, performing a 1031 exchange 
benefits the owner in two ways. Deferring the capital gains tax to a later period means 
that it is discounted in present value terms. Also, an exchange gives the owner more 
money when acquiring the replacement property that results in receiving more in rent 
each year from t to t+n if the exchanger acquires more acreage. The size of the 
investment in the replacement property is also greater because of the deferred tax. 
  To fully account for the potential premium placed on an exchange, equations (1) 
and (2) show the present value of a sale–purchase and an exchange of the two properties 
in period t.  For a sale (1) captures the amount received from the sale of the first property 
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m t P− represents the owner’s basis in the relinquished property, the capital gains tax 
rate is cg τ , and
S
t P is the purchase price of the replacement property. 
S
t C is the transaction 
cost of the sale. This is followed by the rent,
S
i R , received each year per acre for the 
second property after ordinary income taxes, represented by o τ . The last term is the value 
of the sale of the replacement property in period t+n discounted to period t.    9 
 
The value of an exchange shown in (2) is largely the same as that of a sale except 
there is no capital gains tax paid after the sale of the first property.  Since we assume that 
all of the proceeds of the sale of the first property are used to acquire the second, the 
second property using an exchange will be of greater value than a sale.  Equation (5) is 
the “no free money” restriction that rules out any outside financing in acquiring the 
second property.  Equation (3) is the discount rate δ  and the discount factorβ .  Equation 
(7) provides the basis for the remainder of the analysis by capturing the premium placed 
on an exchange by subtracting the present value of the sale from that of the exchange in 
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  In equation (7), the first quantity captures the fact that the landowner will be able 
to accrue more in rents each year from the ownership of the replacement property since   10 
they were able to acquire a more acreage than if they had used a sale–purchase strategy 
that requires paying capital gains tax at time t. This is a result of the “no free money” 
constraint in equation (5). As will be shown later, this is a function of the capital gains 
tax rate and the income tax rate. A higher income tax reduces the difference in the rents 
received between an exchanged property and a purchased property following a sale. This 
quantity is always positive, as is the second term in equation (7) that reflects the benefit 
from being able to defer the cost of paying capital gains tax into the future. This benefits 
the seller in two ways. The present value of the cost of paying capital gains tax is less 
because it is discounted, and the replacement property is of higher value than with a sale, 
as was described when discussing rents. 
Before moving to more general analysis it helps to get a sense of what the 
exchange premium per acre is in a simple hypothetical scenario. It also helps to look at 
the first term capturing rents, and the second reflecting the effect of the change in land 
values separately. 
Looking first at the second term, consider a scenario where a property increases 
from $1,000 to $4,000 per acre from t-m to t. Using a like-kind exchange, the seller 
delays paying capital gains tax and acquires a property of the same value per unit, 
$4,000.
4 Using a sale–purchase strategy with no additional financing allows the seller to 
acquire a second property worth only $3,550 per acre. The tax bill when selling this 
replacement property in t+n is based on the realized gains from t-m to t+n. If the second 
property for both the exchange and the sale increase in value by 20% from t to t+n, then 
the exchange and the sale properties are worth $4800/acre and $4260/acre, respectively. 
                                                 
4 Of course, it is possible that someone buys a larger amount of land, but keeping the analysis to a per unit 
basis makes the results easier to understand.     11 
Assuming a capital gains tax rate of 15% means that the exchange property tax due in 
period t+n is $570/acre, while the same value for the sale is $106.50/acre. Therefore, 
assuming a standard discount rate of 3% and n=5, the present value of the second term in 
(7) in period t is $66/acre. 
To estimate the effect of an exchange on rents it is necessary to make an 
assumption about the relationship between land values and rents. A standard approach 
used here is to assume that the value of the exchange and sale property in period t is equal 
to the present value of the discounted stream of rents for an infinite number of periods.  
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For the hypothetical case being considered, the present value of the exchange premium 
per acre from the rent portion of equation (7) where n=5, and the landowner’s marginal 
income tax rate is 30%, comes out to $43. Without discounting, the value per acre is just 
over $18.  For comparison, rent per acre for cropland in the Cornbelt sold for $100 to 
$165 in 2008
5. Combining the results from both parts of equation (7), the premium placed 
on an exchange in this scenario is about $100. 
                                                 
5 http://www.nass.usda.gov/Charts_and_Maps/Land_Values_and_Cash_Rents/crop_rent_map.asp    12 
The question then is how much would the exchange premium change for such an 
individual? Before arriving at an exact number, it is not immediately clear whether the 
exchange premium will be higher than in the previous scenario. An increase in the 
income tax rate reduces the exchange premium, by reducing the difference between rents 
from an exchange versus a sale, while an increase in the capital gains tax rate makes it 
larger. A higher capital gains tax increases the value in deferring the tax on gains into the 
future since a larger amount is being discounted. So, keeping the marginal income tax 
rate at 30% but increasing the capital gains tax rate to 20% brings the exchange premium 
up to $154. To isolate the effect of the income tax, keeping the 15% capital gains rate but 
assuming an income tax rate of 39.6% results in an exchange premium of $104.  
Changing both the income tax rate to 39.6% and the capital gains tax to 20% brings the 
exchange premium to $147.  
The premium becomes bigger if the growth in the value of the second property 
from t to t+n is relatively bigger than the growth of the original property from t-m to t.  
Using the above example but assuming a doubling of the value of the original property 
from t-m to t, and a 300% increase in the value of the second property yields a per acre 
exchange premium from the non-rent portion of (7) of $219.70. While 300% may seem 
large, it is mild relative to the growth in the market value of farmland near some urban 
areas where there is intense development pressure. Recall that this does not include the 
value to an exchange from the rent portion of (7) that would increase the value.   
  This requires generalizing (7) slightly to incorporate the capital gains tax rate into 
the term capturing rents, which can be done by assuming that the value per acre of the   13 
second property is equal to the net present value of the infinite stream of rents received 
from putting the land to its most valuable use. 
    The premium can, of course, vary significantly if there are changes to the value of 
the original property, the value of either property, the capital gains tax rate, the income 
tax rate, and the number of years n that the second property is held.  To more easily 
consider the relative influence of each of these factors on the exchange premium it helps 
to make further substitutions to (7) to put it entirely in terms of the value of the original 
basis by including parameters to capture the change in value of the first and second land 
parcels.   
(11) : 0 ≥ γ percent change in value from t-m to t.   
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Using equations (8) through (14), we can write (7)--the premium value of an 
exchange over a sale–purchase strategy--solely in terms of the value of the original 
property and the choice parameters including capital gains tax rate, income tax rate, the 
discount rate, change in value of original property to period t, and the change in the value 
of the second property. It is assumed that all of the money remaining after the sale or 
exchange or sale of the first property is used to acquire the second property. This means 
that the second property will be of higher value for an exchange than a sale. Rents are   14 
converted into property value by assuming that the price paid for the second property is 
equal to the discounted infinite stream of rents that would accrue from cash leasing the 
land, 
(17)
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Considering the effect of the ordinary income tax rate on the value of the exchange 
premium above the sale requires evaluating the condition for several states of the value γ, 
the growth in the value of the relinquished property from time t-m to t.
6 When γ is less 
than 1, the sign of the derivative is positive. The value of an exchange premium is 
negatively related to the income tax rate when γ is greater than one, or stated another 
way, when the value of the relinquished property doubles. Intuitively, this is true because 
the larger the growth in the relinquished property, the greater the stream of rents that are 
                                                 
6 We only consider positive and nonzero values of γ.   15 
derived from the replacement property; hence, because of capital gains tax due in a sale–
purchase arrangement, the value of replacement property will be lower. The result comes 














P R * = , it follows that the difference between the rents will be 
negative. In the last case of γ=1, the sign is zero. 
To evaluate the effect of a change in capital gains taxes, the cases must be 
evaluated based several parameters. The sign depends on what piece of the equation is 
dominant, and this will depend on the length of time the assets were held, respectively, 
the rental income ratio, δ, and the discount rate. Although these are not generalizable, two 
cases are. First, it is easy to see that when γ and α equal one, the sign of the derivative is 
zero. The other case that is self-evident is when both properties increase in value by more 
than 100%: 








when γ>1, α>1. 
In this case, as capital gains taxes increase, the incremental value of an exchange over a 
sale is positive. We will not run through all the possible combinations of parameters; 




ANALYSIS OF FARMLAND EXCHANGES 
We now turn from our analysis of the theory of an exchange to present a 
descriptive study of the disposition of real farm property using Federal tax data. We   16 
assemble a time series of tax-deferred exchange and farmland sales data from the Internal 
Revenue Service’s Sales of Capital Assets (SOCA) Panel Study for tax years 1999 
through 2005. The SOCA Panel Study contains information on like-kind exchanges, 
recorded on the IRS Form 8824 and attached to an individual’s tax return. The advantage 
of the SOCA data is that it offers access to detailed information on the 1031 exchange. 
The form contains information on the asset class of both the relinquished property and the 
received property, the dates of the transactions, as well as information on the fair market 
value (FMV) of the property received, and the deferred gain on the exchange. Our 
analysis focuses on three permutations of like-kind transactions involving real farm 
property. These are: farmland exchange for farmland, non-farmland property exchanged 
for farmland, and farmland exchanged for non-farmland property. The SOCA data 
provide information on the fair market value of the assets exchanged, as well as the 
length of time the assets were held. Information for all farm land sales is also presented. 
 
SOCA DATA 
In order to answer questions about Section 1031’s effect on changing farmland 
values, it is necessary to identify the types of assets exchanged. We source our data from 
the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income (SOI) program. The program 
provides data on tax laws as mandated by the Revenue Act of 1916. The SOI publishes 
statistics on an annual basis that cover all facets of Federal tax policy. As part of their 
charge, the SOI developed a stratified sample of individual returns to study the form 1040 
Sales of Capital Assets (SOCA). The most recent panel was initiated in tax year 1999   17 
with a cross-sectional sample from the population of all individual returns for that year. 
As described by the SOI: 
“This periodic study provides detailed data on the sales of capital 
assets  reported  in  the  capital  gains  schedule  of  the  individual 
income  tax  return,  and  on  sales  of  residences  and  personal  or 
depreciable business property.” (IRS 2009) 
 
Form 8824, the form that reports like-kind exchanges, contains a wealth of 
information about the type of asset class of the relinquished property, received property, 
dates of the transactions, as well as information on the fair market value (FMV) of the 
property received, the adjusted basis of the property relinquished, any additional 
property, cash, or assumed liability (often called the “boot”) involved in the exchange, as 
well as any recognized or deferred gain on the exchange. Based on the taxpayers 
description of the like-kind properties involved in the exchange, we classify the property 
as farm-ranchland or other type of like-kind property.   
Farmers and non-operators who own farmland may also dispose of farmland 
through a regular sale, and to the extent there are gains or losses, recognize them for 
income tax purposes. To capture sales of farmland in each tax year of the study, we 
compile additional SOI data from two other sources: Schedule D of Form 1040, and 
Form 4797. 
It should be noted that because we do not have direct access to the SOCA panel 
microdata, our analysis relies on special tabulations obtained from the SOI Individual 
Returns Branch. Unfortunately, the lack of microdata and the short time period precludes 
regression modeling because aggregating the data to yearly data points results in so few 
observations we lose important variation and thus have no way to identify coefficients of   18 
interest to policy makers. Despite the lack of microdata, the tabulations on a national 
level are valuable because they provide the first objective examination of the state of real 
farm property exchanges during a crucial time period. 
 
Time series analysis of exchanges 
 
The number of like-kind exchanges involving farmland has increased in recent 
years. However, these exchanges continue to represent a relatively small share of 
farmland dispositions, including sales. At the same, time exchanges generally involve 
larger transactions. While farmers engage in a number of like-kind exchanges, the 
majority of exchanges involving farmland are by nonfarmers. However, exchanges by 
nonfarmers tend to involve smaller amounts with less gain to defer. 
Table 1 presents data on like-kind exchanges from 1999-2005.
7 The first line of 
the table reports total number of like-kind exchanges reported by taxpayers in each tax 
year, regardless of asset type. The exchanges in table 1 describe the three types of 
exchanges involving farmland. These include: (1) farmland exchanged for another type of 
like-kind property, for example, residential rental property or timberland; (2) farmland 
exchanged for other farmland; (3) other property exchanged for farmland. 
  Like-kind exchanges involving farmland were the greatest in the 1999, both in 
absolute and relative terms. In 1999, the number of farmland exchanges was more than 
twice as great as the next highest year, 2002, and accounted for 7% of all like-kind 
exchanges. 
                                                 
7 Data for 2004 were unavailable.   19 
Table 1 
Counts of like-kind exchanges involving farmland 
             
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2005 
Type of exchange             
Total like-kind 
exchanges  116,014  135,221  121,495  179,971  186,774  n.a. 
Farmland 
exchanged for 
other property  2,539  177  568  5  95  n.a. 
Farmland 
exchanged for 
farmland  5,022  2,198  2,144  2,785  32  2,562 
Other property 
exchanged for 
farmland  5  138  19  74  15  n.a. 
             
Total involving 
Farmland  7,566  2,513  2,731  2,864  141  2,562 
Source: Statistics of Income, Sales of Capital Assets Panel Study. 
Note: n.a.=not available. 
 
 
Farmland-for-Farmland exchanges were the dominant form of exchange 
 
  The majority of exchanges involving farmland on either end of the exchange were 
dominated by the farmland-for-farmland exchange. In fact, exchanges in which farmland 
was exchanged for farmland accounted for 97% of exchanges in 2002 and 77% over the 
1999-2003 period. 
While overall like-kind exchanges have continually grown since 1999, that year 
was the biggest year for total exchanges involving farmland. Farmland for farmland 
exchanges in 1999 were nearly twice the number of any following year. Figure 1 
illustrates the contrast across years. Clearly, there was a flurry of activity in 1999. To 
address why there were a relatively high number of farmland exchanges, more research is 
needed; however, a number of provisions in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 may 
provide some clues about exchange behavior in 1999. A provision of the Act reduced the 
20% capital gains rate to 18% (8% for taxpayers in the 15% ordinary income tax bracket)   20 
for assets held more than five years, beginning in 2001.
8 Thus, one plausible strategy 
would be to exchange the land in 1999 and hold it until 2006, when it could be sold and 
the gains taxed at the 8% or 18% amount, rather than selling in 1999 and paying the 20% 
rate. Another feature of the Act allowed for a larger exclusion for estate tax purposes for 
certain land subject to a permanent conservation easement. This feature would have 
added an incentive for farmers to exchange high value land, perhaps because of the 
development potential.
9 Under this strategy, a farmer or owner of farmland would defer 
capital gains taxes, and their estate would benefit from the larger exclusion, which was 
$100,000 in 1998 but increased to $500,000 in 2002. These are two plausible reasons for 
the volume of exchanges in 1999, but more research is needed. 
                                                 
8 It should be noted the Act also reduced the capital gains rate to 20% (10% for taxpayers in the 15% 
bracket), however this would not encourage exchanges but rather sales. 
9 Because the Act explicitly targeted land near metropolitan areas, farmer-developer exchanges were likely.   21 



















Farmland for farmland Farmland for other property Other property for farmland Poly. (Farmland for farmland)  
Source: Statistics of Income, Sales of Capital Assets Panel Study. 




Sale of farm real property outnumbered exchanges by a wide margin in every year of 
the study 
  To provide perspective on the size of exchanges, Table 2 presents long-term and 
short-term gains involving farmland. Clearly, the sale of farmland is the primary method 
for disposition of farmland. In 1999, for every exchange involving farmland, nearly 7 
sales took place.  
 
Table 2 
Counts of sales involving farmland 
             
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2005 
             
Long-term net 
gains  40,149  43,398  39,707  53,922  53,567  n.a. 
             
Short-term net 
gains  9,077  4,958  5,635  2,227  2,812  n.a. 
             
Total  49,226  48,356  45,343  56,149  56,379  n.a. 
             
Source: Statistics of Income, Sales of Capital Assets Panel Study. 
Note: n.a.=not available.   22 
 
The average value of an exchange was greater than average value of a sale. 
  While the number of farmland exchanges has increased it is important to keep in 
mind that the number of like-kind exchanges conducted during this period was a small 
fraction of all dispositions of real farm property. In most years, like-kind exchanges only 




Fair market value of exchanges involving farmland 
             
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2005 
Type of exchange             
Farmland 
exchanged for 
other property  834,692  178,731  105,640  16,611  139,666  n.a. 
  [328.81]  [1010.18]  [185.92]  [3169.96]  [1475.92]   
             
Farmland 
exchanged for 
farmland  4,030,358  387,983  311,036  379,971  134,342  1,160,440 
Average value  [802.57]  [176.53]  [145.07]  [136.45]  [4185.12]  [452.94] 
             
Other property 
exchanged for 
farmland  7,399  206,316  31,851  26,958  17,499  n.a. 
Average value  [1412.00]  [1496.24]  [1701.44]  [362.14]  [1199.42]   
             
Source: Statistics of Income, Sales of Capital Assets Panel Study. 
Note: Values are in thousands of dollars. Average values per exchange are in brackets. n.a.=not available. 
   23 
Table 4 
Value of gains from farmland sales 
             
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2005 
             
Long-term net gains  
  1,416,890  1,841,149  1,240,430  2,409,368  1,063,414  n.a. 
(average)  [47.13]  [50.34]  [9.57]  [34.38]  [19.20]   
             
Short-term net gains 
  280,078  26,406  85,278  14,504  24,197  n.a. 
(average)  [30.85]  [5.33]  [15.13]  [6.51]  [8.61]   
             
Source: Statistics of Income, Sales of Capital Assets Panel Study. 
Note: Values in thousands of dollars. n.a.=not available. Average values per sale are in brackets. Long-term 
net gains from sales reported on Schedule D and Form 4797 Part I, II, and III. Short-term net gains from 




More nonfarmers exchange farmland but farmers defer more gains 
 
Table 5 presents the number and value of like-kind exchanges made by farmers 
and nonfarmers in tax year 2005. Taxpayers are classified as farmers if they reported 
income from farming, for example, reported a profit or loss from farming on Schedule F 
(Form 1041), or reported farming as their occupation on Form 1040. The first notable 
feature of the table is that nonfarmers engaged in far more like-kind exchanges involving 
real farm property. The second feature of the table that strikes the reader is that the 
potential tax-deferred value of the exchange is much greater for farmers, that is, the fair 
market value of the property received was much higher than the property relinquished, 
particularly when the exchange involved farmland and other types of real property. 
Nonfarmers, however, have much more deferrable gains because they represent the 
majority making the exchanges. 




Farmers and nonfarmers, exchanges in 2005 
           
           

















Farmers           
           
Farmland for farmland  624  572,820  106,339  479,688  466,481 
    [917.98]  [170.42]  [768.73]  [747.57] 
Nonfarmers           
           
Farmland for farmland  1,938  587,620  358,922  32,636  261,685 
    [303.21]  [185.20]  [16.84]  [135.03] 
           
Total  2562  $1,160,440  $465,261  $512,324  $728,166 
Source: Statistics of Income, Sales of Capital Assets. 
Notes: Average values per exchange are in brackets. Dollar in thousands. 
 
Nonfarmers conducted a majority of like-kind exchanges, regardless of whether 
the exchange exclusively involved farmland or not. In 2005, non-farmers made 1,938 
farmland-for-farmland exchanges, while farmers reported 624 such exchanges. There are 
far more nonfarmers in the workforce, so in a relative sense, farmers made a relatively 
large amount of exchanges compared with the rest of the US population. In 2004, the 
latest year for which the data are available, there were 2.1 million principal farm 
operators (USDA 2007) out of a civilian labor force of 139 million (USBLS 2007). 
Despite making up less than 2% of the workforce, farmers conducted 24% of the 
farmland-for-farmland exchanges. Depending on the orientation, the difference in the 
number of exchanges conducted by farmers and nonfarmers might be surprising. From 
the point of view of an economic or business interest, on the other hand, we might expect 
farmers to own a majority of the farmland in the US and therefore exchange most of the 
farmland, particularly when the exchange is farmland-for-farmland. Based on evidence 
from the 1999 Agriculture and Economics Land Ownership Survey, non-operators owned   25 
51% of the 434 million acres of cropland in the US (ERS 2003). Though the data on land 
ownership and land rental are not available to further describe nonfarmers, many are 
likely non-operators that do not participate in the farm operation or report farm income 
and would not be considered farmers for tax purposes. 
Nonfarmers (non-operators) on average are more likely to hold farmland as an 
investment. Thus, the average value of farmland-for-farmland exchanges was smaller for 
nonfarmers, which would suggests that smaller amounts of farmland were exchanged. In 
an average exchange, nonfarmers received land worth about $303,000, while farmers 
received land worth $918,000 on average. 
The value of Section 1031 is much greater for farmers than nonfarmers. Farmers 
likely exchanged more in terms of acreage, and the spread between the FMV of the 
received property and the adjusted basis of the property relinquished was also much 
larger. Despite the fact that nonfarmers conducted more than three times the farmland-
for-farmland exchanges, farmers deferred nearly twice as much gain. Farmers deferred 
$466 million in 2005 for farmland-for-farmland exchanges, while nonfarmers deferred 
$261 million. The average deferred gain for farmers was $747,566 compared to an 
average deferred gain of $135,121 for nonfarmers. 
The gains recognized by taxpayers in an exchange generally include any cash 
received, as well as the fair market value of other property received plus any net 
liabilities assumed by the other party, all reduced by incurred exchange expenses. In 
farmland-for-farmland exchanges, gains recognized by farmers were slightly larger than 
the gains they deferred; nonfarmers recognized much less in gains than they deferred. On   26 
average, farmers and nonfarmers recognized gains of $768,731 and $16,840, 
respectively.  
 
The Fiscal Year 2010 President’s Budget calls for changes to the ordinary income and 
long-term capital gains tax rates 
 
The President’s budget for 2010 consists of three amendments to the Code that 
would have practical effects for parties who wish to sell or exchange like-kind property. 
First, the President’s budget extends tax law changes enacted in 2001
10 and 2003
11, which 
means retaining the 10%, 25%, 28%, and part of the 33% tax brackets for individual 
income rates. Second, the budget sunsets ordinary income rates from 2001 for taxpayers 
in the top two brackets, 33% and 35%. After the sun-set, the marginal rates return to pre-
EGTRRA levels of 36% and 39.6%. Finally, the budget creates a new 20% marginal rate 
for capital gains for taxpayers who would otherwise be in the 36% and 39.6% ordinary 
income brackets.  
In table 6 we consider changes to the ordinary income and capital gain tax 
changes and the associated incremental value (net present value) of an exchange. We 
have labeled the incremental value as the “exchange premium” and the difference 
between the premiums is reported below. 
 
Table 6 
Effect of the President’s 2010 Budget on the incremental value of an exchange 
             
Current Tax Rates    Proposed Tax Rates 
  Change in the Exchange 
Premium Per Acre 
Income  Capital 
Gains    Income  Capital Gains 
   
33%  15%    36%  20%    $93 
35%  15%    39.6%  20%    $193 
             
                                                 
10 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA). 
11 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA).   27 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on a per acre basis of $1000. 
 
We assume the relinquished property growth rates are γ=4 and α=2, and the 
holding period of the replacement property is 15 years. From the table, we can see that 
the exchange premium increases in each scenario—taxpayers would be better off 
exchanging land than conducting a sale-purchase transaction. A taxpayer who initially 
faces a top marginal income rate of 33% and a capital gains rate of 15%, will benefit by 
$93 per acre by engaging in an exchange if the proposed tax rates are enacted. The 





   
  Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code permits the nonrecognition of gains or 
losses from the sale of real property if the seller engages in an exchange of ‘like kind’ 
property. Important characteristics of the policy have potential consequences for the 
market for farmland, including requirements that a replacement property be identified 
within 45 days of the sale of the previous property and that the exchange is completed 
within 180 days. In this article we address some of these concerns to the extent the data 
allow us. We present a theoretical model of like-kind exchange that we adapt from a 
common formulation, for example, like that of Ling and Petrova (2008). Our equation 
states the differential value of an exchange versus a sale-purchase strategy as the 
discounted value of rent streams plus the tax-value of the deferral offered by the Section. 
We also present the first national analysis of tax data for like-kind exchanges 
deferring capital gains under Section 1031. Using data from the IRS’s Sales of Capital 
                                                 
12 The taxable income amount for the 33% rate for taxpayer filing a joint return in 2008 was $195,850 to 
$349,700. The taxable income amount for the 35% rate for a joint return in 2008 was $349,700 or greater.   28 
Assets Panel Study, we examine like-kind exchanges and total farm land sales for the 
years from 1999 to 2005. We present a time-series of exchange volume as well as data on 
the characteristics of the exchange including the value of assets involved and the value of 
gains deferred. Further, because of the detail of the tax data, we are able to examine the 
extent to which famers are participating in Section 1031 like-kind exchanges. 
Our analysis of the tax data provides several important facts about the use of 1031 
provision. First, exchanges involving farmland made up a small minority of all exchanges 
between 1999 and 2005. Despite the continued growth in the use of the provision, 
exchanges involving farmland accounted only 1% of the total exchange volume. 
However, when an exchange involved farmland, the most dominant form was the 
exchange where farmland was traded for other farmland. At its highest point, the 
farmland-for-farmland exchange accounted for 97% of such exchanges. Active farmers 
were also the minority of exchangers, even when the exchange involved farmland. 
Nonfarmers conducted three times the farmland-for-farmland exchanges as farmers. 
Despite the larger difference in volume, farmers tax-deferral value of the exchange was 
far greater for farmers. 
  Our research provides evidence of the value of the IRC’s Section 1031 provision. 
Based on simulations of our theoretical model using plausible assumptions about asset 
growth, we show how proposed tax changes will affect the tax value of the deferral. We 
show that taxpayers, especially farmers, conduct exchanges that have relatively large tax 
deferral values. Future research needs to address this issue with microdata, perhaps, by 
further exploiting the panel aspect of the SOCA data. To address policy issues concerning   29 
the ability of farmers to continue to own farmland, further research is needed to address 
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